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Introduction and Background
The list of disease pathogens that can be transmitted in the air is extensive. This list
includes the common cold, SARS, measles, Hansen's disease (leprosy), polio, influenza,
Legionella (Legionnaires’ disease and Pontiac fever), and tuberculosis (TB). TB, SARSCoV-1, avian influenza, varicella, and now SARS-CoV-2 all have received public notice
due not only to their known or assumed ability to be transmitted in the air rapidly from one
individual to another, but also for their virulence. Other bioaerosols that can be transmitted
through the air include bacteria, fungal spores and fragments, dust mites, and pollen. This
document was developed to address control of bioaerosols transmission, primarily
through ventilation and other engineering controls. This monograph will focus on
engineering controls in non-industrial/non-healthcare facilities such as office buildings,
schools, public assembly, theaters, and governmental buildings. It does not, however,
address ventilation in residences, either single or multi-family.

Modes of Transmission for Bioaerosols
1. Definitions
Various definitions are commonly used by infection control, industrial hygiene, and public
health practitioners to define the types of potential transmission modes resulting in
respiratory infections. The following section will define, in relatively simple language,
several particle and transmission-related terms in an attempt to clarify the various
transmission modalities from a physical and biological perspective.
Particles includes all types and forms of particulate matter, regardless of dimension
(size), mass, and form. Particles can be solid or liquid, and may be comprised of any
form, or combination, of matter (e.g., mineral, biological, etc.).
Droplets are variously defined depending on the context and practice area. Droplets can
range from a few micrometers (µm) in diameter to >1000 µm (1, 2), but any that are >100
µm tend to settle rapidly. Droplets from a respiratory emissions perspective are generally
described as high velocity (ballistic) particles of saliva or respiratory fluid that are greater
than 100 µm in size that are expelled from infected individuals (3, 4). From an industrial
hygiene perspective, droplets are particles that are large enough that they remain
airborne only briefly before settling out due to gravity. Droplets as large as 200 µm may
still travel up to 1.5 meters from a coughing person before settling (5). Also, keep in mind
that droplets greater than 100 µm are not considered inhalable, and infection resulting
from droplets >100 µm would be considered via the droplet transmission pathway as
opposed to inhalation pathway.
Droplet transmission is transmission from a source to a receptor via high velocity
droplets (ballistic droplets) expelled by the infected individual. Transmission is more likely
to occur when someone is close to the infected individual.
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Droplet nuclei are particles derived from larger droplets through desiccation resulting in
a smaller, lighter particle. Droplet nuclei are generally defined as particles that are less
than 5 µm in size (6) although some use higher cut-offs since particles larger than 5 µm
can remain airborne for extended periods of time.
Aerosols are fine solid or liquid particles that are suspended in air regardless of their size
(7) but are generally in a size range that can be suspended in air for more than a few
seconds (8). A standard industrial hygiene definition of aerosols is a suspension of solid
or liquid particles in a gaseous medium typically ranging in size up to 100 µm in diameter,
which can be suspended in air and be inhaled into the respiratory tract (7, 9). By this
definition, aerosols include droplet nuclei as well as smaller droplets. Aerosols may be
suspended for longer times when air currents are present to maintain the aerosols in an
airborne state (8).
Airborne transmission is another term that is defined differently depending on the
scientific and technical field in which it is used. Airborne transmission generally includes
aerosols, droplet nuclei, and other particles <100 µm that can travel more than a meter
or two and remain suspended in air for more than a few seconds. Regarding infectious
disease transmission, airborne transmission is transmission via particles that remain
suspended in air for sufficient periods, such that they can be disseminated or travel over
long distances, while still retaining their biological viability and/or remain capable of
replication (viruses).
Contact transmission is transmission from a source to a receptor typically through
physical contact with an infected individual (e.g., touching during a handshake) or
contaminated surfaces (fomites).

2. Transmission via Droplets, Aerosols, and Droplet Nuclei
People with contagious respiratory infections may produce droplets and smaller aerosols
when they cough, sneeze, or engage in other forced respiratory activities that generate
high velocity airflow over the thin fluid layer covering the respiratory mucosa. When the
particles are >100 µm, this type of transmission is generally referred to as droplet
transmission (4). Aerosol transmission may also occur through speaking and breathing,
especially vigorous actions such as shouting, singing, and heavy physical exertion, which
generate particles smaller than typical droplets (8, 10). It appears that relatively smaller
particles are derived from the deeper lung regions as compared to the upper airways and
oral cavity (8, 11, 12). Many respiratory droplets are large enough to see or feel, and such
large particles may contain dozens of microorganisms or hundreds of viruses (13).
However, Schlieren imaging and strobe photography have revealed that much larger
clouds of smaller particles (i.e., aerosols) accompany these larger particles. Many of the
droplet-size particles rapidly shrink in size as a result of dehydration to form droplet nuclei
(14, 15). Droplets, droplet nuclei, and other aerosols containing microorganisms are the
primary vehicles of respiratory infection.
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Particles capable of infectious disease transmission can generally be segregated into two
classes: airborne and non-airborne particles (16). Non-airborne or contact particle
transmission would include droplets and other large particles that settle rapidly and are
only transmitted via close contact with an infected individual. However, particles that are
not “true” airborne particles still can pass through the air directly from an infectious person
to another, uninfected, individual. As noted above, airborne particles are those that can
remain suspended in the air such that they can be disseminated over longer distances
than droplets while retaining their infectivity. Aerosols from other sources (e.g., medical
aerosol generating procedures such as intubation, bronchoscopy, and nebulization
conducted on infectious patients, and mechanical systems such as misters and cooling
towers) also can generate droplets, droplet nuclei, and other aerosols containing
potentially infectious microorganisms.
The size of the particle is an important determinant of airborne and contact transmission,
as the aerodynamic particle diameter can determine both the distance the particle may
travel in air, and whether and where it will settle onto surfaces, as well as where the
particle is most likely to deposit within the host’s respiratory tract or other mucosa (8, 17).
For this reason, physical (social) distancing between individuals is a very important
pathway control when considering larger particles such as droplets that travel short
distances at high velocity but settle rapidly. Spread of pathogens by these larger particles
relies on direct contact to the mucosa or contact with settled particles on surfaces. Smaller
aerosols and droplet nuclei can reach receptors by travelling on air currents, being
recirculated by ventilation systems, and by going over and around protection such as
temporary protective barriers, face shields, and face coverings that are not tight-fitting.
Smaller particles can follow air currents within rooms, including air currents generated
through ventilation, respiration, thermal plumes, and fans. They are diluted and removed
by ventilation, filtration, and surface static charges that attract the smaller particles (e.g.,
walls and other surfaces), or they can increase their size through particle agglomeration
and settle out on horizontal surfaces.
The dynamics of airborne infections that spread from person-to-person have been
analyzed using mass-balance equations, similar to those applied to the study of other
environmental contaminants (18-24). These models demonstrate that the expected
number of cases among a given number of susceptible persons is generally proportional
to the average concentration of infectious droplet nuclei in a room, the probability that the
particles will be inhaled, and the ability of the inhaled particles to infect the host (i.e.,
whether the dose and infectivity of an agent is sufficient to result in an infection). Because
the concentration of smaller aerosols and droplet nuclei in a room is generally proportional
both to the number of infected persons present in the room that are expiring the infectious
agent, and to the generation rate of infectious agents, the probability of transmission is
related to time, distance from the source, dilution and air mixing, airflow patterns, and the
number of airborne infectious particles. Thus ventilation, along with spending less time in
enclosed or crowded environments, is important in preventing transmission.
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Airborne Transmission within Buildings
Historically, with the exception of measles and tuberculosis, airborne transmission of
respiratory pathogens has been viewed with skepticism by researchers, scientists, and
medical professionals, with the belief that most pathogens are transmitted by means of
large infectious respiratory droplets (e.g., >60 µm in diameter) (25) over distances of two
meters or less and through contact with contaminated surfaces. One of the reasons for
this skepticism is the difficulty in detecting the airborne agent. Infectious aerosols are
usually present at very low concentrations (compared to non-biological particles), and
most air sampling methods affect viability and infectivity of the agent, particularly viruses,
thereby limiting or preventing recovery and detection. As a result, culture analysis is
problematic for determining the true concentration of infectious airborne viruses (26).
Newer analytical methods, employing quantitative reverse transcriptase-polymerase
chain reaction (qRT-PCR) to detect nucleic acids, including viral RNA, afford a sensitive
and rapid approach to quantifying low concentrations of organism-specific nuclei acids.
These analytical methods, however, cannot differentiate between viable and non-viable
and infectious and inactive agents.
The numerous outbreaks of person-to-person airborne infections that have been studied
in detail suggest two transmission patterns: within-room and beyond-room exposure.
Within-room transmission occurs when an infectious individual and susceptible person
occupy the same room, the air is relatively quiescent, and droplet nuclei and/or aerosols
accumulate and disperse within the space. Beyond-room transmission occurs when, due
to pressure differentials, airflow patterns, ventilation systems, and other factors, air
contaminated with infectious agents moves between adjacent spaces. Particle
recirculation describes the entrainment of infectious particles into the return air of a
mechanical ventilation system, from which they are then distributed (or redistributed)
throughout the building via the ventilation system. There is ample evidence demonstrating
an association between ventilation and the control of airflow directions in buildings and
the transmission and spread of airborne infections, including tuberculosis, measles,
chickenpox, and SARS (27).
Airborne Near-Field and Far-Field Exposures
Within a room, contact between a source and a worker can be described as either nearfield or far-field, depending on the distance separating the two. Closer proximity to a
source implies exposure to a potentially higher local concentration of bioaerosols. Indeed,
a study from Kulkarni et al. (28) reported that infectious aerosol concentrations of
respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) were significantly lower at five meters away from an
index case as compared to one meter away, and that these aerosols were non-detected
at 10 meters distance. The degree of risk, however, depends on the balance between the
rate at which a source generates infectious particles and the rate at which they settle out
and are dispersed by air currents within the room and subsequently removed via exhaust
air and exfiltration. For example, near-field exposure to a person with measles, who is
4

generating a large, local cloud of infectious particles, might convey substantial risk, even
for a brief exposure. On the other hand, far-field exposure would carry less risk, because
the total infectious particle concentration would be significantly lower further from the
source (28). In contrast, near-field exposure to a TB case of average to low infectiousness
may not substantially increase a worker’s risk, relative to that of far-field exposure for the
same duration (29). Therefore, estimates of risk and potential exposure vary with each
type of bioaerosol and its virulence.
Dissemination of Infectious Aerosols
Transmission of airborne agents can occur in a variety of ways. The airborne transmission
of many infectious agents, such as viruses and TB, generally rely on a human source
expiring the agent into the air, as opposed to an environmental source that becomes
airborne. Environmental sources differ from human or other animal sources because the
infectious agent can remain viable and propagate outside the body in the general,
although sometimes specialized, environment. For example, transmission of Legionella
bacteria and infectious fungi, such as Aspergillus fumigatus and Cryptococcus
neoformans, are typically associated with environmental sources rather than human or
other animal sources. In addition, some organisms can be transmitted indirectly from
human-to-human, as in the case of vectors and vehicles. In the case of vectors, a nonhuman organism (e.g., mosquitos, ticks, etc.) carries and transmits an infectious
pathogen from one source into another without becoming infected by the pathogen. A
vehicle refers to substances or articles, such as food, water, blood, and fomites that can
indirectly transmit an infectious agent to a susceptible host.
Human-to-human airborne transmission of infectious aerosols has been demonstrated
primarily through studies that have occurred on transmission in healthcare settings.
Studies on varicella-zoster virus (VZV) have demonstrated that the virus is able to travel
long distances, via airborne routes, and cause secondary infections (30, 31). Several
studies of measles outbreaks in outpatient clinics, some of which included retrospective
airflow dynamics analysis, have reported that airborne spread of the virus was the most
likely mode of transmission (18, 20, 32). Numerous TB outbreak investigations have
confirmed the transmissibility of biological agents via the airborne route (33-36).
Whether or not certain organisms, most notably viruses, can be transmitted via the
airborne route has been the subject of much debate. Numerous articles have
demonstrated the ability of aerosols containing viruses to migrate within large spaces or
become entrained in ventilation systems while maintaining infectivity, including SARSCoV-1 (37, 38), MERS (39), and SARS-CoV-2 (40, 41). Studies have also demonstrated
the presence of viral nucleic acids in HVAC systems (42-45). However, airborne
transmission critics point out that these studies cannot prove the virus is active and are
therefore insufficient in confirming the airborne route of pathogens because the virus has
not successfully been grown in tissue culture. For example, Nissen et al. (46) reported
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that SARS-CoV-2 viral RNA was detected in central ventilation system exhaust filters in
a hospital over 50 meters from COVID-19 patient wards, indicating that the virus can
potentially be transported long distances. Although the infectiousness of the agent at that
distance was not determined, the authors concluded that there may be a risk for airborne
dissemination and transmission of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. Unfortunately, proving
infectivity is difficult since sampling typically occurs long after the virus has been expelled
into the environment resulting in inactivation, and because sampling and culturing viruses
is difficult due to multiple environmental and technical factors (44, 47).

Preventing and Controlling Exposure
Selecting appropriate and effective control measures can be challenging and depends on
the nature and the source of the bioaerosol. Source elimination and avoiding exposure
altogether removes the risk. However, complete exposure avoidance is not usually
possible for human-derived sources, such as viruses that spread by droplets, aerosols,
and droplet nuclei. Each control measure described in the hierarchy of controls, as
described in the next section, offers varying levels of exposure reduction. Identifying
proper exposure control measures is critical to reducing risk when employee exposure to
biological agents is unavoidable.
Fundamentally, risk is a function of a hazard and a person’s potential or known exposure
to that hazard. When controlling a biological hazard, there is a need to identify all relevant
factors involved in risk. Since risk involves both the likelihood of incidence and the
potential severity of the hazard, an evaluation of the factors influencing “likelihood of
incidence” and “severity” must be considered (48). Factors impacting likelihood of
exposure to bioaerosols include: proximity to the source(s), health screening practices,
building operations and ventilation factors, and cleaning practices. Severity of the hazard
depends on the virulence of the agent involved, potential health effects, and individual
susceptibility factors, such as age and comorbidities. Unfortunately, our understanding of
the magnitude and severity of hazardous biological agents is often incomplete. When
possible, and practical, environmental testing is appropriate for identifying the specific
biological agents, characterizing their ability to cause adverse health effects, and
understanding the potential exposure pathways. These tests, and their results, are
needed to understand the hazards posed from contaminated environments or infectious
sources.
Decision matrices are commonly used to assess the risk from chemical exposures but
can also be used to assess risks from biological agents. Appendix A outlines a decision
matrix process that can take these factors into account when deciding on control
measures. Often, a layered risk minimization strategy that includes engineering,
administrative, and personal protective equipment (PPE) controls is recommended.

1. Hierarchy of Controls
Controlling exposures to occupational hazards is the fundamental method of protecting
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workers. Traditionally, a hierarchy of controls has been used as a means of determining
how to implement feasible and effective control solutions. Figure 1 depicts a
representation of the traditional hierarchy of controls.

FIGURE 1: Hierarchy of Controls
Source: NIOSH (49).

As shown in Figure 1, the methods of controlling a hazard generally become less effective
moving down the hierarchy.
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•

Elimination is the physical removal of the hazard. Applying this method
specifically to airborne infectious agents, this method could include elimination of
naturally occurring infections, as has occurred with smallpox through vaccination
efforts (50). This method could include the limiting/removal/prohibition of infected
sources from being present in an environment, and the removal of contaminated
sources, such as disinfection of water systems and mold remediation.

•

Substitution is replacing the hazard with something less hazardous. This
particular hazard control does not apply to airborne infectious agents.

•

Engineering controls are those that help to isolate people from the hazard. These
controls are favored over administrative controls and PPE for controlling exposures
because they are designed to remove or reduce the hazard. Isolating
contaminated spaces, implementing local exhaust ventilation, increasing supply
air ventilation rates, introducing additional outside air to dilute airborne agent
concentrations, redirecting airflow to avoid spreading bioaerosols, improving
filtration, and using ultraviolet (UV) light to kill or deactivate the airborne agents are
all examples of engineering controls.

•

Administrative controls are those that change the ways people work while they
are exposed to a hazard. Immunization of workers against the infectious agent of

concern, working remotely to limit the number of persons who are exposed to
bioaerosols, limiting the number of persons in common or enclosed areas, and
enforcing social distancing are all examples of administrative controls. During the
SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, administrative controls used included working remotely,
limiting the number of employees in common or enclosed areas (e.g., break rooms,
conference rooms, elevators), enforcing social distancing by removing chairs or
use of floor markings, and providing alternate areas for employees to eat that
maintain appropriate separation. Careful handling of contaminated materials to
minimize release and dissemination of bioaerosols would also be an administrative
control.
•

Personal protective equipment (PPE) is respiratory equipment or other gear that
protects individuals from airborne agents. This control includes protection of the
respiratory system (e.g., respiratory protective equipment) as well as specific body
parts (e.g., hands, eyes, head, etc.).

All of these types of controls have a place in protecting workers from bioaerosols. In many
instances, multiple controls are needed.

2. Elimination, Source Control, and Source Reduction
Elimination of the source of bioaerosols is the best way to reduce the potential for
exposure and the associated risk. For some infectious agents, however, elimination of
the source is not possible or practical. In those cases, reducing the number of infectious
sources in a building or occupied space is the next best option. This could occur through
requiring workers who are ill to not report to work, implementation of medical or health
screenings prior to entry, and requiring vaccination or other immune status testing. In a
pandemic setting, working remotely and limiting occupancy will also reduce the potential
number of infectious sources in a building or workplace.
Reducing the number of infectious sources (e.g., contagious individuals) in a community
is the general role of medical care personnel and facilities and the particular role of public
health programs and facilities. In the case of certain airborne diseases (e.g., TB),
physicians diagnose and treat individual patients while local public health programs work
to ensure that patients remain on therapy until they are no longer infectious and are
ultimately cured. Public health programs also perform contact tracing so that exposed
family members, coworkers, and other individuals that may have been contacted by
infectious sources can be identified and evaluated for disease. These efforts have
historically resulted in fewer infectious TB cases in the community, and less TB
transmission (51).
Breathing, talking, coughing, and sneezing all generate aerosols, with a high degree of
variability from individual to individual (52-55). Instances of superspreading events, where
one individual infected multiple people, whereas other infectious individuals infected few
or none, have been documented (37, 56-58). Detection of infected individuals and
initiation of effective treatment can reduce the number of infectious particles that
individuals release by reducing the number of infectious agents in the body. For diseases
8

that spread from person-to-person, simple prevention measures such as covering coughs
and sneezes with an elbow, tissue, or face covering, can reduce the number of large
respiratory droplets available to the receptor. These measures can also help limit the
number of particles that subsequently become droplet nuclei through evaporation.
Measures to control microbial colonization and growth on building materials (e.g.,
moisture control, proper heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) system
maintenance and operation, etc.) can reduce the potential number of environmental
sources of opportunistic pathogens to which occupants may be exposed. Prompt
response to moisture intrusion and other water damage can prevent mold growth. Prompt
attention to remediating mold contamination can minimize potential occupant exposures
to allergens, irritants, and other bioaerosols (59).
For waterborne environmental infectious agents, such as Legionella, it is crucial that the
production of contaminated aerosols, which may then be inhaled by susceptible
individuals, be minimized or eliminated. Outbreaks of disease have been reported
involving mist- and aerosol-generating water features, including decorative fountains (60,
61), hot tubs and spas (62, 63), humidifiers (64, 65), and even grocery store vegetable
mist machines (66, 67). Cooling towers have also been implicated in multiple communitywide outbreaks of Legionnaires’ disease, in some cases infecting hundreds of individuals
(68-73). Since even well-maintained cooling towers can still be colonized by Legionella
bacteria, it is important to control and eliminate, to the extent possible, the potential
transmission of contaminated aerosols from mist- and aerosol-generating water features,
and from cooling towers to susceptible populations (74).
Limiting exposure time can also be a method of reducing risk. The duration of exposure
required for biological agent transmission is dependent on the agent, the airborne
concentration of the agent, the dose required for infection, the environmental conditions,
and the immune status of the individuals. The air concentration of infectious agents
depends on the number of infectious sources present, the rate at which these sources
generate infectious aerosols, the size of the space in which the infectious sources are
released, and the effectiveness of ventilation to remove or dilute the concentration of
infectious particles in the air.
Removal of Bioaerosols
The average concentration of bioaerosols is related to the number of sources and the rate
at which those sources generate infectious agents. While source control and elimination
constitute a higher, and potentially more effective, control measure for person-to-person
contagions such as SARS-CoV-2 and other viruses, immunization and cessation of
community spread are typically beyond employer and building operator control.
The airborne concentration of bioaerosols is also related to the rates at which the
microorganisms die, become inactive, deposit, or leave an area. The natural susceptibility
of agents to various environmental conditions plays a role in reducing the number of
infectious particles available for direct contact or inhalation. Little data are available
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regarding the natural attenuation rates of airborne infectious agents under ambient indoor
conditions. The effects of temperature, relative humidity (RH), and absolute humidity on
microorganism viability and particle size are important factors (75-83). The measles virus
has been found to persist in an infectious state for at least an hour while airborne in an
office setting (20, 32).
Experimental studies of SARS-CoV-2, under controlled conditions using a rotating drum,
have suggested a viable half-life in air of ~1.2 hours (84, 85). Biryukov (85) investigated
the effects of relative humidity, temperature, and droplet size on the stability of SARSCoV-2 in a simulated clinically relevant matrix dried on nonporous surfaces. The results
demonstrated that SARS-CoV-2 decayed more rapidly when either humidity or
temperature was increased, but that neither droplet volume (1 to 50 microliter [μl]), nor
deposition surface type (stainless steel, plastic, or nitrile glove), significantly impacted
decay rate (85). Another study indicated that SARS-CoV-2 survives better at low
temperatures and extreme relative humidity levels (84).
Absolute humidity may also affect airborne transmission of influenza. It may also provide
a “framework that helps to explain the timing of both epidemic and pandemic influenza in
temperate regions” (79). Humidity can affect viral transmission of Influenza A viruses as
a result of its effect on droplet size and dehydration, and inactivation, which may explain
the variability of airborne transmission in temperate regions (86). Humidity may also play
a role in receptor susceptibility as low RH (< 40%) may result in impairment of mucociliary
clearance and other immunologic dysfunction (87). Fungal and bacterial spores, as well
as amebic cysts, may be assumed to remain viable and infectious for as long as they are
airborne.
Particle deposition by diffusion, electrostatic precipitation, gravitational settling, and
thermophoresis acts to remove infectious aerosols from their suspension in air.
Resuspension of deposited particles may occur through occupant activities that cause
disruption or turbulent air movement (4, 88-91). In most situations, particle deposition
plays a small role in the removal of bioaerosols relative to other mechanisms, such as
local exhaust and general ventilation (92). Implementing effective engineering controls
offers the most promising and immediate approach to protect multiple workers and
building occupants. Ventilation, if designed and implemented properly, can play a critical
role in controlling the dissemination of bioaerosols throughout workplaces, and reducing
airborne transmission of infectious agents.

3. Ventilation
The American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers
(ASHRAE) (93) defines ventilation as the process of supplying air to, or removing air from,
a space for the purpose of controlling air contaminant levels, humidity, or temperature
within a space. Natural ventilation is provided by thermal gradients, wind loading, and
diffusional effects through windows, doors, or other intentional or unintentional openings
in the building envelope. This discussion will focus on mechanical ventilation systems
utilizing powered equipment, such as fans or blowers. These systems lend themselves to
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more precise controls that enable specific air delivery rates and directed airflow. Auxiliary
devices, such as louvers, dampers, and supply and exhaust air registers and grilles, aid
in further adjusting the movement of air into, out of, and within the space requiring control.
Ventilation standards, such as ASHRAE Standard 62.1, which prescribe ventilation rates
for certain commercial and industrial spaces, have historically been used to provide
guidance for the control of occupant-generated and low-level indoor air pollutants.
General ventilation has been used to reduce the particle load within a space, including
incidence of infectious diseases transmitted from person-to-person through the air (e.g.,
the common cold and tuberculosis) (93-95). However, ASHRAE Standard 62.1 was not
developed to control infectious disease transmission. Therefore, past and current
ventilation standards geared toward the control of contaminants should not be relied upon
to prevent transmission of airborne infectious diseases. Nevertheless, the recommended
minimum ventilation rates may, to some degree, reduce airborne infections (94, 96).
Higher ventilation rates have been proposed to prevent the transmission of airborne
diseases (93).
Ventilation, if designed and implemented properly, plays a critical role in reducing
workplace airborne contaminants. The use of ventilation to mitigate disease spread in a
pandemic plays a critical role in reducing virus-containing droplet nuclei and aerosols in
the air. This in turn helps to reduce the risk of airborne transmission of disease. The two
types of ventilation that can remove and thus reduce the concentration of airborne
contaminants are local exhaust ventilation (LEV) and general ventilation (GV).
LEV involves the removal of contaminants generated within a space by the use of various
designs of capture devices (i.e., hoods). This capture takes place as close to the source
of the contaminant generation as possible. Examples of LEV in commercial buildings
include kitchen range hood exhausts and exhausts on sewage injector pumps, among
others. LEV is more frequently utilized in industrial, laboratory, and healthcare settings.
The reader is referred to a variety of industrial ventilation resources such as the ACGIH
Industrial Ventilation Design Manual (97). Historically, the term general ventilation (GV)
has been applied to the concept of providing a combination of clean outside air and
cleaned recirculated air for acceptable indoor air quality in non-industrial applications. The
intent is to reduce indoor contaminants such as carbon dioxide, body odor, and low-level,
low toxicity indoor pollutants, while providing thermal conditioning in an energy-efficient
manner.
The term general exhaust ventilation (GEV) is often used interchangeably with GV.
However, GEV emphasizes the exhaust portion of the general ventilation system where
contaminant generation and its control are major considerations. For example, the focus
could be on exhaust components that draw large volumes of contaminated air for
discharge to the outdoors, such as with power roof ventilators or wall panel fans. In reality,
GEV consists not only of exhaust fans, but also the makeup air (MUA) that replaces the
air that was removed. Thus, it is equally appropriate to refer to GEV as general ventilation.
This MUA requirement is best met with dedicated supply MUA systems to avoid the
uncontrolled influx of unconditioned air through openings in the building envelope such
11

as windows, doors, louvers, or vents. For most non-industrial settings, a single
recirculating HVAC system provides the general ventilation, rather than separate exhaust
and MUA systems. The factors that determine how effective a ventilation system is in
reducing the risk to airborne transmission of infectious disease are the combination of the
amount of “fresh” outdoor air being introduced into the building and the level of filtration
of the air that is recirculated.
The Role and Limitations of Outdoor Air
Since contaminant exposure is controlled by removing contaminated air and replacing it
with clean (or cleaner) air, ideally replacement or MUA would consist of outside air that is
free of contaminants of concern. This is not always the case, however, in that outside air
is not guaranteed to be clean or free of contaminants. Such contaminants may include
bioaerosols such as pollens or mold spores; ambient pollutant gases and vapors such as
ozone, sulfur dioxide, or nitrogen oxides; fine or ultrafine particulate matter such as
ambient dusts, smokes, and tailpipe or stack particulate matter; and motor vehicle
exhaust, cooling tower emissions, and building stack and other exhausts that are located
too near to and/or upwind of building air intakes.
Another consideration regarding the use of outside air for indoor contaminant dilution is
the physical attributes of outside air, including temperature and moisture content
(humidity). The use of 100% outdoor air, although preferred due to the higher
contamination control potential, is rarely possible with existing systems. Most currently
installed HVAC systems are not capable of conversion to 100% outside air. This is
primarily due to inadequate heating and cooling capacity, especially under extreme
temperature and humidity conditions. The alternative is to introduce the maximum amount
of outdoor air that the system can accommodate. This is then coupled with the
conditioning of the mixed outdoor air and building return air with the appropriate level of
filtration, heating and cooling, and dehumidification. The critical issue is that the MUA and
recirculated air should have little or no contamination.
Regarding ventilation air and infectious aerosols, there is concern with the effects of
humidity and temperature on the propagation and deposition of infectious aerosols. Ward
and Xiao (98) found a consistently negative relationship between relative humidity and
the number of infectious cases. Increased relative humidity was associated with
decreased cases in both epidemic phases (i.e., ascending and descending). Lower
relative humidity causes aerosols to desiccate, resulting in lighter and smaller particles
that tend to remain suspended longer (98). Low relative humidity may also contribute to
an increase in respiratory illness by weakening the defenses provided by the mucous
membranes.
General Ventilation
General ventilation can reduce and remove airborne contaminants in one of two distinct
airflow arrangements. These are 1) dilution ventilation and 2) displacement ventilation:
12

1) Dilution ventilation is where the intent is to mix (thus, dilute) contaminated air with
clean air to lower the concentration of the contaminant to below some
recommended or accepted safe level to avoid adverse health effects. A safe level
of virus load is difficult to establish. Therefore, if this is the only method available,
it is most effective with as much clean dilution air as possible and with as much
complete air mixing as possible.
2) Displacement ventilation is used where the intent is to keep overall room air mixing
to a minimum. Instead, the intent is to push the contaminated air away from the
breathing zone in as close to a laminar, directed flow as is possible, thereby
replacing contaminated room air parcels with clean ones. Displacement ventilation
has been recommended as an important approach to minimize occupant exposure
to highly infectious agents (99-101).
Turbulent, mixed flow of dilution ventilation involves installing exhaust outlets or exhaust
fans at various nonspecific locations, with MUA also delivered at random or nonspecific
locations. Enhanced mixed flow includes mixing devices, such as ceiling-mounted or
floor-standing fans. The intent is to more homogenously mix contaminants within the
space before exhausting them, thus diluting the overall concentration. However, it must
be remembered that turbulent mixing is likely to increase the potential for occupant
exposure.
For infectious aerosols, where each occupant is a potential contaminant source, the
airflow pattern is the most critical issue to determine, modify, and control. For a general
ceiling exhaust system with open doors, windows, or vents as the only source of available
replacement air, consideration should be given to installation of a ducted, powered supply
air system with low velocity airflow introduced at or near floor level (102). The supply air
can then move past workers and up to the exhaust without passing other workers. If there
is an existing supply air system, it is important to consider modifying the system to duct
and deliver the air at or near floor level. Figure 2 illustrates an example of an appropriate
supply/exhaust airflow arrangement.
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FIGURE 2: Displacement Ventilation
Source: ACGIH (103).

In directed flow, air from the supply diffuser may be specified to direct the airflow from the
outlet toward a contaminant source where the contaminant may then become entrained
in the supply airstream and directed to the exhaust grille in line with the flow direction.
This arrangement tends to create some turbulence and mixing of the clean airstream with
the contaminated airstream. However, much of the mixed contaminated airstream may
be captured by the exhaust or return air grille. This may be applicable to individual
workstations where supply air is directed into the workstation, (e.g., a cubicle) with a
return air grille located above the cubicle. Directed flow may be capable of removing
contaminants utilizing lower airflows than turbulent flow systems.
Vertically directed displacement ventilation, taking advantage of thermal displacement,
should effectively reduce risk of worker exposure to potentially infectious aerosols
exhaled by other workers. This method introduces slightly cooler air at a low level along
the floor, allowing the heat from occupants and other sources (e.g., electronic equipment)
to warm the air, causing it to rise toward the upper portion of the space where it can then
be removed through exhaust or return grilles located at or near the ceiling. This protocol
minimizes air mixing and raises contaminants up and out of the breathing zone of the
workers. To understand thermal plume for a human being, consider that the air expelled
from human lungs is significantly lighter and more buoyant than the surrounding
conditioned air because of its inherent relative humidity and human body warmth (see
Figure 3). In general, replacing air is preferable to mixing air with high velocities when a
high-risk contaminant is present.
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FIGURE 3: Thermal Plume in Displacement Ventilation
Source: Price Industries (102).

Figure 4 demonstrates the difference between displacement and dilution/mixing
regarding virus distribution. Notice the location of the virions (depicted as blue dots) with
each type of ventilation. The white box in the bottom right corner is a low-velocity, nonturbulent supply air diffuser, while the circular object at the top left is a high-velocity supply
air diffuser.

FIGURE 4: Mixing vs. Displacement Ventilation and the Difference in Virus Distribution
Source: Price Industries (102).
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Circulating and Mixing Fans
Large ceiling fans will cause downflow of air around the occupants, and it will return
buoyant bioaerosol particles back towards the occupants’ breathing zone. Taking ceiling
fans offline during a pandemic should be considered. Personal cooling fans are another
source of air movement. It is important to make sure that a fan does not blow air directly
from one worker towards another. The preferred airflow arrangement is vertical
displacement with airflow moving up through the worker’s breathing zone so that it can
be exhausted at or near the ceiling.

4. HVAC System Design and Operation
Proper sizing of HVAC equipment to meet occupancy demands (specifically, airconditioning and dehumidifying capacity) is critical for temperature control and moisture
removal from ventilation air. Dilution ventilation using filtered outdoor and/or recirculated
indoor air can reduce the concentration of some externally or internally sourced
bioaerosols. Excepting Legionella spp., external (outdoor) sources are generally not a
significant concern. However, dilution ventilation is ineffective where the sources are
downstream of the HVAC system’s filters, or where sources within a building emit
infectious particles at rates greater than the removal rate provided by the ventilation
system. In addition, increased air velocities may elevate indoor bioaerosol concentrations
if the increased turbulence causes biological particle release from areas of microbial
surface contamination (104).
General ventilation may be quantified in terms of the air exchange rate within a space,
expressed as air changes per hour (ACH). ACH is the volume of clean air delivered to a
space per hour divided by the volume of that space. In general, increasing the ACH can
increase the dilution rate (for mixed flow), or the removal rate (for displacement flow), of
indoor generated contaminants.
It is important not to confuse increased total air volume (as ACH) with increased air
velocity. Increases in total air volume should be accompanied by additional air supply
devices (e.g., registers, diffusers, and grilles) to maintain steady discharge and return air
velocities. Increases in ACH may be effective in the reduction of fine airborne droplet
nuclei and certain fungal elements, such as spores and mycelial fragments. However,
excessive air velocities can result in the reduction of settling coefficients as a removal
mechanism. Thus, the increase in ACH in a dilution ventilation airflow arrangement can
result in an increase in both the time that the particles remain airborne and the distance
that the particles travel from the source.
Distribution
Inadequate and improper distribution of ventilation air throughout a space can create a
multitude of contaminant-related problems. One suggested remedy for controlling
airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2 has been the addition of temporary protective
barriers, such as clear Plexiglas or polycarbonate plastics, to intercept the movement of
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aerosols from point to point. When in-person interactions cannot be avoided, barriers can
provide a physical separation between people to support social and physical distancing
efforts. However, if not designed or installed appropriately, such barriers may obstruct or
interfere with the designed ventilation system airflow. The effectiveness of installing these
barriers may be less than anticipated and, in some cases, may result in worsened
conditions. This would be due to particulate diffusion coefficients and other factors that
affect airflow directions and patterns, potentially resulting in dead zones where
contaminants can build up over time. A variety of methods are available to visualize the
nature of the airflow patterns in the indoor environment. These methods may be useful in
evaluating these potential concerns (105). These methods include physical indicators
such as smoke tubes and heated glycerol as well as virtual visualization by computational
fluid dynamics.
Filtration
Replacing air in an occupied space with clean air is the most important way to control
viral exposure with ventilation. The maximum amount of clean outside air (theoretically,
100% being the most protective) is optimal from the standpoint of minimizing viral load.
However, due to heating and cooling requirements and humidity controls, this is typically
not possible with existing or even modified HVAC systems. Filtration of recirculated air at
the appropriate level may be capable of lowering the viral level to be reasonably as clean
as “fresh” outdoor air. Thus, from a practical standpoint the clean air being provided can
be a combination of as much outside air as the ventilation system can handle, plus the
appropriately cleaned recirculated air.
The amount of recirculated, filtered air can be referred to as the clean air delivery rate
(CADR), expressed in units of actual cubic feet per minute (ACFM) or liters per second
(LPS). The CADR was developed by the Association of Home Appliance Manufacturers
(AHAM) (106) as a standardized testing and reporting method for the efficacy of air
cleaners (see the section on portable air cleaners). This CADR concept can also be
applied to the effective amount of cleaned recirculated air from a HVAC system, based
on the efficiency of its filters. It is estimated as the product of the actual recirculated supply
airflow rate and the effective aerosol removal efficiency:
CADR = airflow rate (ACFM) × removal efficiency.
This amount of filtered air, plus any fresh, outside air, can then be used to calculate the
number of ACH as follows:
ACH = {[CADR + Outside Air (ACFM)] × 60 (min/hr)}/room volume (cu ft).
Filters
Properly installed and maintained filters are essential in HVAC systems to remove
particles from both outdoor (fresh) air and indoor (recirculated) air. Four different
collection mechanisms govern particulate air filter performance: inertial impaction,
interception, diffusion (i.e., Brownian motion), and electrostatic attraction. The first three
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of these mechanisms relate to mechanical filters, and they are influenced by particle size
(Figure 5) (107).

Figure 5: Classic Collection Efficiency Curve with Filter Collection Mechanisms
Source: Adapted from NIOSH (107). See also Brosseau (108).

High efficiency filters each exhibit a unique efficiency curve as determined by the particle
capture efficiency of the filter related to each of the three mechanical capture efficiency
mechanisms stated above, along with the media velocity of the airstream (Figure 6). The
classic combined efficiency curve for each filter is centered about the most penetrating
particle size (MPPS) for that specific filter. Filtration efficiency increases for particles that
are either larger or smaller than the MMPS for each filter. Impaction and interception are
the dominant collection mechanisms for larger particles, while diffusion is dominant for
the smaller size fraction of particles.
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Figure 6: Filter efficiency curves for various minimum efficiency reporting values (MERV)
Source: Reprinted with permission from ASHRAE (109).

Filter Efficiency
Air filters are commonly described and rated based upon their collection efficiency,
pressure drop (or airflow resistance), and particulate-holding capacity (107). Arrestance
describes the ability of a filter to capture synthetic test dust. Further information on the
testing of filters is provided in Appendix B.
While the highest efficiency filters, such as HEPA and ultra-low penetration air (ULPA)
filters, have been calculated to exhibit an MMPS between 0.11 and 0.21 µm in diameter,
HEPA filters are rated for their efficiency at removing 0.3 µm diameter particles. The
MERV method for rating filters that are not HEPA or ULPA filters provides filtration
efficiency curves over a 0.3 to 10 µm diameter particle size range for clean and dustloaded filters (110). These data provide a reliable means of selecting filters for control of
respirable size particles, including bioaerosols. MERV ratings are compiled on a 1 to 16
scale, which describes a filter’s minimum performance for comparison to other filters. It
enables the user to select a filter that addresses the user’s critical size efficiency criteria
without exceeding the demands of the system and the air-handler fan.
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Figure 7: Minimum Efficiency Reporting Value (MERV) parameters.
Source: ASHRAE Standard 52.2-2017, Table 12-1 (110).

Filters in HVAC systems should be of the highest rating, compatible with the system and
the air-handler fan. The filters must meet the filtration efficiency necessary to remove the
contaminant or biological agent of concern. When the filters are of the same physical
configuration and a filter’s MERV rating increases, the filter pressure drop across the filter
also increases.
If higher-efficiency filters are installed in a system designed for lower efficiency filters, it
may be necessary to modify the air-handler’s filter housing. It may also be necessary to
replace the air-handler fan motor and/or blower to accommodate the increased
resistance/pressure drop. Most central air handlers can support flat panel filters with a
MERV rating of 7 or 8. These filters, however, are not effective at capturing bioaerosols
and other particles in the size range of 0.3 to 3.0 µm, which includes particles such as
fungal spores and viruses. For this reason, filters with a MERV rating of 13 or greater are
typically specified for the removal of infectious aerosols.
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Filter Types
Air filters come in a wide range of types and configurations. The most common filters are
panel filters, which are typically constructed as one, two, or four-inch panels, and are
available in a variety of common or custom sizes. These panels are usually constructed
of cardboard or metal frames, with a fiberglass, cotton-polyester, or synthetic media fill
that may be in the form of a thick fiberglass or polyester pad or a thin pleated media bed
with extended surfaces.
These filters typically have low efficiency values of MERV 1 to MERV 8, although some
higher efficiency models (up to MERV 15) are becoming increasingly available. Panel
filters are often used as pre-filters to more expensive, higher efficiency final filters. See
Figure 8.

Figure 8: Panel filters from left to right: fiberglass disposable, high efficiency mini-pleat,
linked polyester internal ring panel, pleated panel filter
Source: Courtesy of Tri-Dim Filter Corporation (111).

Higher efficiency filters, made of fiberglass or synthetic fiber media, are available in
various configurations, such as bag or pocket filters, pleated box or cartridge filters, and
multi-panel wedge filters. See Figure 9.

Figure 9: Higher efficiency filters (MERV ratings 11 and above) from left to right: pocket or
bag filter, synthetic mini-pleat cell filter, aluminum separator fiberglass pleated cell filter,
rigid fiberglass deep pleat, multi-panel wedge filter
Source: Courtesy of Tri-Dim Filter Corporation (111).

Panel filters, as shown in Figure 8, are typically installed in side access, slide-in formed
metal tracks. Formed metal tracks typically offer no sealing mechanism at the filter-totrack interface, or between filters that are installed side-by-side. This lack of sealing
results in significant leakage via air bypass in the final installation. Filters should be
gasketed along the track and between each slide-in filter to reduce bypass. Higher
performance extruded tracks with nylon pile seals may be available in some instances to
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reduce filter to track leakage. Often, standard size filters do not completely fill the track.
In situations where filters do not completely fill the entire filter bank, permanently installed,
gasketed, blank-off plates should be installed to close any gaps in the final installed rack.
Higher efficiency filters (i.e., MERV ratings 11 and above), as shown in Figure 9, are
typically installed in face-loading filter frames arranged in built-up filter racks. These
frames are normally caulked in place and are gasketed along the filter-to-frame interface
to reduce air bypass or leakage. The filter is installed onto the gasketed frame and held
in place with turn clips or spring clips. The frames may be furnished with extended clips
to allow for the installation of a panel pre-filter. The purpose of the pre-filter is to extend
the life of the high efficiency final filter.
In any of these installations, it is important to examine the rack or frame system at each
filter change out, in order to minimize bypass. Filters should never be removed or reinstalled without shutting down and locking out the fan system power. This is done to
prevent dislodged dust from entering the air handling system. Before restarting the fan,
the filter housing should be vacuumed to remove any dust or debris generated during the
filter change out process.

5. Air Cleaners to Reduce Infectious Disease Exposures
While increasing outdoor air ventilation rates and retrofitting HVAC systems with
enhanced filters can reduce exposure risks in indoor environments, these approaches
take significant time and capital cost. Most existing HVAC systems in buildings and
facilities were not initially designed and constructed to comply with healthcare codes and
requirements. Therefore, these systems cannot deliver the amount of outside air
ventilation or accommodate a high level of filtration without potentially damaging the
equipment or failing to control the indoor environment. Portable air cleaners can be
selected, sized, installed, and operated without modifying existing mechanical ventilation
systems. They can still provide effective control of potentially infectious aerosols.
Measures to clean indoor air can help to reduce the concentrations of pathogencontaining aerosols. These measures can subsequently reduce the risk of infectious
disease transmission by supplementing the benefits of outdoor air ventilation. Portable
air cleaners offer the most readily available, temporary, off-the-shelf approach to
effectively reduce localized indoor exposures to infectious bioaerosols outside of
healthcare settings. Air cleaners meet several criteria of an ideal engineering control: they
can be rapidly installed, can capture aerosols close to the source, and in most cases, do
not require significant effort, training, or expertise by users or occupants.
Standalone air cleaners (e.g., portable HEPA filtered units) can be used to supplement
outdoor air ventilation supplied through HVAC systems in order to achieve an equivalent
air exchange rate (AER). These air cleaners are capable of significantly reducing
infectious aerosol concentrations in workplaces and offices. Ultraviolet germicidal
irradiation (UVGI) and other technologies that inactivate but do not capture viruses may
be capable of reducing airborne concentrations of infectious aerosols (112).
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Portable Air Cleaners
In its 2003 “Guidelines for Environmental Infection Control in Health-Care Facilities,” and
reinforced in the 2019 update, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (113)
p. 228 recommended using “…recirculation HEPA filters…to increase the equivalent
room air exchanges.” The guidelines further recommend that, “Recirculating devices with
HEPA filters may have potential uses in existing facilities as interim, supplemental
environmental controls to meet requirements for the control of airborne infectious agents.”
The use of in-room portable air cleaners for supplemental control of particles (including
bioaerosols) has increased in recent years. However, air cleaners are subject to some of
the same limitations as dilution ventilation. For example, low airflow rates limit the
performance of many portable air cleaners (114). Therefore, in order to be effective, air
cleaners must be appropriately sized for optimum particle removal. The rate of air
circulation through a unit must be greater than the source emission rate. It must also be
capable of delivering a volume of clean air commensurate with the size of the space. This
may be difficult to achieve for strong sources and in large spaces. Portable air cleaners
using HEPA filters or electrostatic precipitators have demonstrated the highest efficiency
with respect to particle removal (115-118). Also, air cleaners with 90%-efficient filters
have shown promise as supplemental control measures to prevent certain airborne
infectious diseases (119, 120). However, the availability of air cleaners that use HEPA
filters make them more desirable to reduce disease transmission risks.
When installing or placing portable air cleaners, it is important to avoid interfering with
existing HVAC systems, or inadvertently directing potentially contaminated air into a clean
area. This often requires the expertise of an engineer, an industrial hygienist, or an
experienced contractor to properly site each device (112).
The term “portable air cleaners” covers a wide range of devices that are intended to
remove or reduce airborne contaminant concentrations through a variety of methods. Not
all air cleaners are effective at controlling airborne contaminants, or at significantly
reducing health risks from physical, chemical, or biological agents, despite manufacturer
claims. Without regulatory requirements, and with little enforcement of unwarranted
claims relating to health benefits, consumers must proceed with skepticism, and must
perform their own due diligence.
As mentioned previously, the AHAM has developed a standardized testing and reporting
method for the efficacy of air cleaners, called the CADR (106). The CADR indicates the
volume of filtered air an air cleaner delivers, with separate scores for tobacco smoke,
pollen, and dust. The higher the CADR number for each pollutant, the faster the unit filters
the air. This method does not directly address airborne pathogens (e.g., viruses, bacteria,
fungi, etc.), but it can be a useful surrogate to compare different air cleaners. The US
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) evaluates claims for air cleaners to control
pathogens. According to the March 2020 FDA guidance related to SARS-CoV-2, “…air
purifying devices are intended for medical purposes to kill pathogens/microorganisms in
the air by exposure to UV radiation or remove them through filtration” (121), p. 7. For
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SARS-CoV-2 and other pathogens, the FDA recommends that air purifiers (cleaners)
demonstrate a 4-log (i.e., 99.99%) reduction of agents through a combination of capture
or destruction.
Ultraviolet Germicidal Irradiation
Ultraviolet germicidal irradiation (UVGI) has been used for supplemental control (with
ventilation being the primary control technique) of airborne microbial contamination in
indoor spaces. UVGI systems have been utilized for disinfection and inactivation of fungal
and bacterial microorganisms since the 1930s (122). A classic study by Wells et al. (123)
used germicidal lamps in schools to prevent the epidemic spread of measles. Riley and
Nardell (124) described the merits of UVGI to control other infectious aerosols and
discussed considerations for proper lamp placement, installation, and maintenance.
Germicidal lamp intensity to achieve good killing of airborne microorganisms must be
balanced with the need to protect people from overexposure to ultraviolet radiation.
Germicidal lamp fixtures have been placed in HVAC system ductwork, laboratory areas
and airlocks, operating rooms, and crowded waiting rooms and assembly areas (125).
Direct irradiation of room air, as well as in-place and portable air cleaners that return room
air after filtration or UV irradiation, have been studied for control of airborne infectious
agents (119, 120, 126). UVGI is used to directly irradiate room air and may be an
appropriate means of protecting workers against airborne infectious diseases (127).
However, worker eye and skin exposures to UVGI must not exceed recommended
exposure limits (128-130). Such engineering interventions to control airborne infection
have been discussed at length in the TB control literature (129, 131). It is noted that the
principles are broadly applicable to other airborne infections.
UVGI has been suggested to provide a supplemental control technology for SARS-CoV2 applications. It is important to note that many factors can reduce the effectiveness of
UVGI systems, many of which may not be readily recognized by users. Therefore,
constant maintenance and verification of system performance is needed. UVGI
equipment often requires significant modification to existing mechanical equipment, as
well as a requirement for ongoing service of the UVGI system.
Note: The use of UVGI at typical wavelengths (i.e., ~ 254 nm) requires protection from
the UV source for all occupants, including both employees and maintenance personnel.
This necessary because UV exposure is harmful to human skin and eyes at relatively low
source power. Far UVC, at wavelengths less than 222 nm, has been shown to be at least
as effective as 254 nm but with little or no adverse health effects (132). Far UVC
disinfection systems can be used in occupied public spaces with no special protections
from UVGI irradiation (133, 134). However, studies are still ongoing to determine whether
far UVC can be effective in commercial and other large-scale application where UVGI is
currently utilized. More study and evaluation of this technology is encouraged.
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Other Technologies
Ozone generators have not been shown to effectively remove bioaerosols (117). Also,
other studies have found that ozone is not an effective gas-phase biocide. Ozone is a
toxic gas that, at concentrations capable of inactivating pathogens and environmental
microbes, causes adverse health effects in people. The US Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) (135) recommends not using ozone generators in occupied spaces. When
used at concentrations that do not exceed public health standards, ozone applied to
indoor air does not effectively remove viruses, bacteria, mold, or other biological
pollutants (135).
Ozone damages the lungs when inhaled. Even at low concentrations, ozone can cause
chest pain, coughing, shortness of breath, and throat irritation. Ozone also worsens
asthma and other chronic respiratory diseases and compromises the body’s ability to fight
respiratory infections. Individual susceptibility to ozone varies. However, it has been found
that even healthy people can experience adverse effects, such as breathing problems,
when exposed to ozone. Recovery from the harmful effects of short- or long-term ozone
exposure can occur, but lasting damage can be anticipated when exposed to higher levels
or for longer durations (136).
Incidental ozone production from indoor equipment should be minimized and managed.
Intentional production of ozone indoors should be treated as a pesticidal application with
all necessary precautions and oversight, and it should only be done in unoccupied
spaces. Neither people nor animals should be present in indoor spaces where ozone is
generated or where it is allowed to accumulate at concentrations above ambient or
outdoor levels.
Air cleaning or purification devices that use ozone production, UV, ionization (e.g., bipolar,
corona discharge, etc.), electrostatic, photocatalytic oxidation, or other novel approaches
that claim to reduce or kill bioaerosols, including viruses, bacteria, and fungi, are defined
under the Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) as “pesticide
devices” (137). This definition does not include devices used to treat persons infected
with microorganisms. Historically, devices that are regulated under this program include
UV light units that claim to kill, inactivate or suppress growth of fungi, bacteria or viruses.
It also includes air treatment units (i.e., air cleaners or air purifiers) that claim to reduce
or eliminate microorganisms or allergens, including air filter units, air ionizer/electrolytic
units, air ozonation units, and air UV light units.
While the EPA Office of Pesticide Programs does not require registration of such devices
in the same manner as it does for pesticide chemicals, there is a requirement that
manufacturers have data to support their claims (137). However, unlike registrants of
pesticide products, FIFRA does not require device producers to submit any data
concerning either safety or efficacy of a device prior to distribution or sale. This is
particularly important to note for antimicrobial pesticide devices that claim to disinfect,
sanitize, and/or sterilize items or ambient air. Because microorganisms are generally not
visible to the naked eye, users of such devices by and large cannot evaluate the actual
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performance of the device. The device may be “misbranded” if labels, labeling, and/or
websites for devices, including general or specific efficacy claims, contain any statement,
design, or graphic representation that is “false or misleading in any particular” (137).
Distribution or sale of a misbranded device is prohibited under FIFRA. Therefore, every
producer or seller of such devices is responsible for ensuring that these products perform
as claimed, and that performance claims are not misleading to the intended user. The
EPA can enforce compliance for devices that fail to comply with the act, or mislabel the
device, or make false claims.
A pesticide device that is EPA regulated and that has successfully met the requirements
under FIFRA will include an EPA Establishment Number on the label, on the device, or in
the user manual. Pesticidal devices must be produced in an EPA registered pesticideproducing establishment. Obtaining an establishment number is an administrative
process that is completed upon request to the EPA. EPA establishment numbers are
composed of a company number, followed by a two-letter US state or three-letter country
abbreviation, followed by the unique facility number (e.g., xxxx-PA-xx; xxxxx-CHN-xxxx)
(137).

Summary
This publication from ACGIH® concerns engineering controls, including ventilation, in nonindustrial settings such as: office buildings, public and private schools, theaters,
commercial buildings, and public buildings such court houses. The publication does not
address engineering controls for healthcare facilities. It is also not intended for use of
engineering controls, including ventilation, in residences, either single or multi-family.
There is a separate ACGIH® publication, Ventilation for Industrial Settings during the
COVID-19 Pandemic, which was written to address engineering controls for industrial
facilities to address concerns about SARS-CoV-2 contagion. This publication, which
focuses on non-industrial settings, has broadened the scope to include all bioaerosols,
including contagious viruses such as SARS-CoV-2.
As noted in the section Hierarchy of Controls, there are a variety of recommended
approaches that can be taken to control exposures to a contagious virus or other
bioaerosols. The most common approach for the occupational safety and health
professional is the “Hierarchy of Controls” (Figure 1). This approach has been utilized
successfully in a number of industrial settings where hazardous chemicals are found and
are used daily, and can equally be applied to non-industrial settings. These controls, listed
here from the most effective to the least effective, include elimination, substitution,
engineering controls, administrative controls, and PPE. All of these types of controls have
a place in protecting workers from bioaerosols, and often multiple controls are needed.
Other approaches that have been used successfully in industrial settings include control
banding, which may be applicable in non-industrial settings as well. In this approach, the
occupational health and safety professional examines the pathogen that is of concern,
the pathway that the pathogen takes to reach the target, and the routes of transmission
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(airborne, droplet, fomite) that the pathogen must take in order to infect the target. This
method can be used in conjunction with the hierarchy of controls as listed in the previous
paragraph to address the potential for contagion.
As noted in the section Ventilation, ventilation standards such as ASHRAE Standard 62.1
have historically been used to provide guidance regarding occupant-generated and lowlevel indoor air pollutants. But it is noted that ASHRAE Standard 62.1 was not developed
to control infectious disease transmission. Therefore, past and current ventilation
standards geared toward general contaminants should not be relied upon to prevent
transmission of airborne infectious diseases. In addition, it is generally agreed that
general ventilation does not control droplet transmission (1, 138-140). However, a
ventilation system, if designed and implemented properly by a qualified and competent
professional such as a Professional Engineer (PE) in mechanical engineering, can play
a critical role in controlling the dissemination of bioaerosols throughout workplaces by
reducing droplet nuclei, aerosol, and airborne transmission of bioaerosols.
The proper installation of ventilation system components by qualified and competent
contractors is also critical to the long-term operation and maintenance of the system. In
particular, it is important to select the appropriate filters to be used in the system, and that
the filter efficiency is sufficient for the prevention of bioaerosol transmission. As stated in
the section Filter Efficiency, filters should be of the highest rating, compatible with the
HVAC system and air-handler fan, which will meet the filtration efficiency necessary to
remove the contaminant or biological agent of concern.
This publication also discusses portable air cleaners, UVGI, and other technologies that
may be supplemental to the properly engineered and installed general ventilation system.
These technologies may be of use in specific circumstances where supplemental air flow
and filtration and/or cleaning is needed. However, it is generally agreed that these
technologies, if used, should not replace the ventilation system as the primary means of
preventing the spread of infectious bioaerosols, including SARS-CoV-2, in non-industrial
settings. Their use in select situations should be discussed with a qualified and competent
professional before they are considered for use in a building.
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Appendix A
1. Decision Matrix for Control Measures
The following provides relative concepts for assessing the hazards risks associated with
bioaerosol exposures. Since the application of these decision matrices depends on the
agent and circumstances of exposure, the practitioner should have sufficient experience
and knowledge regarding the class of agents and/or the individual agent of concern in
order to assess the risks and identify and implement the appropriate control
recommendations.
Hazard
The first step in the decision matrix process is to categorize the hazard level of the specific
agent, based upon the severity of possible adverse health outcomes and the type of
adverse health effects caused by the biological agent.
Table A-1
Hazard Categorization
Catastrophic

Critical

Treatable

Marginal

Negligible

Toxic
Response

4

4

4

2

2

Infection

4

4

3

2

2

Irritation

4

3

2

2

1

Sensitization

4

3

2

1

1

Allergy/Asthma

3

2

2

1

1

Exposure Potential
The second step is to categorize the potential for exposure, based upon the anticipated
intensity or magnitude of exposure, and the duration and/or frequency of exposures to
the specific agent. The categories listed below are relative to the class of agents or
specific agent of concern and should be modified accordingly.
Table A-2 provides intensity categories (horizontal row) that would be generally
associated with readily releasable environmental agents, such as fungal spores and dustborne agents present on contaminated materials or surfaces where entrainment/reentrainment is likely. For these bioaerosols, the frequency and/or duration column can be
a simple scale indicating relative frequency and duration. For non-environmental agents,
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such as viruses and infectious bacteria that are primarily spread through human-tohuman contact, the intensity categories might be better suited to the agent’s relative
potential for transmission and the potential dose. For example, the intensity row could
include factors that indicate the presence and number of infected individuals; room size;
ventilation and filtration present; the distance between infected individual and noninfected individuals; the relative infectivity or virulence of the agent, if variable (e.g.,
different serotypes of Legionella pneumophila); presence of comorbidities, etc. The
frequency and duration column could include both frequency of contact with infected
individuals and the time in contact.
Table A-2
Exposure Categorization
Aggressive
Active
Disturbance Disturbance
Constant

Moderate
Activity

Light
Activity

No
Activity

4

4

4

3

2

4

4

3

2

2

4

3

3

2

1

Occasional

3

3

2

1

1

Acute/Short
Term

3

2

1

1

1

Chronic/
Interrupted
Chronic/
Episodic

Risk
Using the categorical values obtained from Tables A-1 and A-2 for a particular agent, one
can estimate the risk level for that agent by creating a matrix similar to Table A-3, where
the risk is the sum of the hazard and exposure category values for the specific agent.
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Table A-3
Risk Level = Hazard + Exposure
Hazard
Category 4

Hazard
Category 3

Hazard
Category 2

Hazard
Category 1

Exposure Category 4

8

7

6

5

Exposure Category 3

7

6

5

4

Exposure Category 2

6

5

4

3

Exposure Category 1

5

4

3

2

2. Potential Controls
The potential controls listed below are provided for guidance and should be tailored to the
agent and circumstances under which exposure to the agent may occur. Significant
differences in control strategies would be required for opportunistic environmental fungi
that might place an immunocompromised individual at risk of infection (e.g., Aspergillus
fumigatus), but whose health effects are typically limited to allergies, in comparison to a
viral pathogen that is readily transmissible and has a high infectivity rate or virulence. The
following control strategies were developed for environmental agents present in or on
contaminated materials and/or surfaces, such as fungi, and may or may not be
appropriate for different agents and under different circumstances. Note that as each risk
level increases, the controls for the lower risk should be included as part of the higher risk
controls.
For exposures in Risk Level 2, focus on minimizing the duration and frequency of
exposure for immunocompetent persons. For persons with possibly compromised or
suppressed immune systems, avoiding exposures to bioaerosols is recommended. Low
level exposures with risk characterization in this category should be minimized or avoided,
if possible, but brief duration exposures to these agents typically can be tolerated and
pose little risk to most individuals.
For exposures in Risk Levels 3 and 4, for brief exposure periods, PPE including
respiratory protection and other equipment, in conjunction with applicable administrative
controls (such as minimizing the duration of exposure) can be considered, while source
elimination should be addressed for chronic or long-term exposures.
For exposures in Risk Levels 5 and 6, NIOSH-approved respirators, with an assigned
protection factor (APF) of 10 or higher, should be used for brief exposure periods. For
intermediate and long-term exposures, rely upon administrative controls, source
elimination, and engineering controls.
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For exposures in Risk Levels 7 and 8, use a combination of respiratory protection, with
an APF of 100 or greater, and feasible engineering and administrative controls for shortterm exposures until or while mitigation is occurring.
When infectious sources are not readily identified, as is often the case, individual
exposure to infectious aerosols is best minimized or reduced by following general
precautions of good hygiene and sanitation. Standard precautions against airborne
infections aim to avoid any exposure to aerosols from other people, the environment, or
animals. Minimizing direct contact with surfaces where airborne agents may settle
through cleaning, sanitizing, and proper hand hygiene is also part of good hygiene
practice for preventing transmission.
Other functional precautions may be administrative, such as policies that encourage ill
workers to remain home until no longer infectious. Likewise, workers at high risk due to
temporary or permanent immunodeficiency, or other predisposed underlying health
conditions, should be excluded from assignments that may expose them to opportunistic
pathogens. Another example of an administrative measure to control exposure would be
the decision to minimize populations of infectious sources through limiting the number of
individuals housed in facilities where a greater percentage of potential infectious sources
and/or high-risk individuals may congregate (e.g., homeless shelters).
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Appendix B
1. Filter Testing and Classification
Arrestance is calculated as a percentage of dust retained on the test filter, versus the
amount of dust fed into the test filter, on a weight basis. Dust spot efficiency classifies a
filter according to its ability to remove finer airborne dusts that can visibly soil interior
surfaces. Dust spot efficiency is calculated as a percentage of staining of a test target
located downstream of the test filter, versus the staining of an identical test target located
upstream of the test filter. A comparison of the two targets is based on light transmission
through each test target. For example, if the upstream test target demonstrates half the
light transmission of the downstream target, the filter is rated at 50% dust spot efficiency.
This light transmission test is conducted during the filter test following subsequent filter
loadings of the filter with the synthetic test dust. This test in no way predicts the filter’s
ability to capture and retain a particle of any specific size.
The MERV method for rating filters is based on a fractional aerosol efficiency test
developed by Hanley et al. (141). This efficiency testing method provides filtration
efficiency curves over the 0.3 to 10 µm diameter particle size range for clean and dustloaded filters. These data provide a more reliable means of selecting filters for control of
respirable size particles, including bioaerosols, than the previous methods. The standard
prescribes the filter’s fractional efficiency for particles of various optical particle diameters.
Filter efficiencies are based upon removal of particles in 12 specific particle diameters
over six cycles, the first with no loading and then five with loading. The filter is loaded with
size-standardized loading dust over the five loadings to simulate accumulation of dust
over the service life of the device.
Polydispersed potassium chloride (KCl) aerosol is generated and the concentrations are
measured upstream and downstream in each particle size, ranging from 0.3 to 10 µm in
diameter, with an optical particle counter (OPC). Removal efficiency for each particle size
is determined following the successive filter loading using the standardized test dust, and
a composite efficiency curve is generated based upon the average minimum removal
efficiency within the three group size ranges (0.3 to 1.0 µm; 1.0 to 3.0 µm; 3.0 to 10 µm).
Each of the fractional efficiencies is charted and the lowest efficiency measured during
the successive filter loadings is used to determine the filter’s minimum efficiency curve.
The lowest efficiency is chosen to avoid confusion with average efficiency and to provide
a minimum expected performance criterion. The composite efficiency for each of these
three groups is then used to calculate the average particle size efficiency (PSE). See
Figures B-1 and B-2.
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Figure B-1: Sample air-cleaner performance report summary. PSE after incremental dust
loading.
Source: ASHRAE Standard 52.2-2017, Figure C-2 (110).

Lowest one from each data point.

Figure B-2: Sample air-cleaner performance report summary. Composite minimum
efficiency curve.
Source: ASHRAE Standard 52.2-2017, Figure C-3 (110).

The filter’s MERV rating is determined by averaging the four minimum efficiencies in each
of the three grouped size ranges, and comparing the results to Table 12 from the
ASHRAE Standard 52.2 – 2017 (Figure B-1), to assign a MERV rating for a given filter
(110).
Specific configurations may offer either lower, or higher, pressure drops for the same
MERV rating, but may also require differing system hardware for their installation. For
instance, a 26-inch deep, MERV 10 synthetic pocket filter may offer a lower resistance
33

than a 2-inch deep MERV 7 pleated panel filter, but it will probably not be compatible with
the filter rack designed for the 2-inch deep MERV 7 filter. Similarly, a 2-inch deep MERV
15 mini-pleat panel may fit into the MERV 7 filter rack, but the MERV 15 filter’s increased
resistance will compromise the system’s fan capacity.
ASHRAE Standard 52 does not cover HEPA filters, which were previously considered
MERV 17 and higher. Most building ventilation systems cannot and do not need to be
retrofitted with true HEPA filters.
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